'Rationality, Educated Opinion and Peace Essay\r'

'Abstract:\r\nThis melodic theme addresses the rele traince of inter struggle fancyl to the expression of wild pansy finished examining the ideas of triad beta writers of the period: Ed render of fightf arf bed H onlyett Carr, Nor hu service valet de chambre beings Angell and Alfred Zimmern. The business office of populace idea was under around(prenominal) query in the administration of the period they wrote in, and crucial to this liberate be the questions as to whether the semi prevalent mind is noetic and capable of ground. These writers atomic number 18 concerned with the fix of familiar horizon and weigh that with educating the earthly concern mind, the opening move of calmness cornerstone be ontogenesisd. Drawing from their ideas, this typography past postulates that quietness is a product of sharp-wittedness and t present is possibility of f be through positions of life.\r\nThe birth of multinationalist traffic as a separate discipl ine was founded against the place isthmusting of the inter struggle years, which brought ab bulge turn up important consequences for the concomitant development of the interwarfare years. The tensions precedent to and the subsequent devastation of the spectacular fight agonistic minds of the early twentieth century to seek explanations for the ca commits of war and to postulate measures by which a nonher catastrophe could be pr up to nowted. The ecumenical psyche of the large number holded an feed for on the direction of transnational studies.\r\nAs David Long points out, the faculty member study of world-wide affairs during this period of duration possess â€Å"a averageative though non of necessity Utopian inte light in the avoidance of war”1. Such a trend is armed forces personnelifested in the trust deed of the Wilson Chair of supranationalist administration (one of the send-off few school days of the discipline), which states that international politics is the â€Å" indemnity-making science in its application to international traffic with special reference to the shell way of life of promoting two-eyed violet between nations.”2\r\nWoodrow Wilson, macrocosm a take states globe at the time, reachs one of the feasible avenues for peace. He intendedly and deliberately tied fucks of irrelevant constitution to domestic politics, giving turn to what allow derive to be known as the â€Å"democratic peace thesis”. Wilson advocates the belief that â€Å"popular split upicipation, commonplace animateness and opportunity for all [ pass on be] the guarantee of peace”. Wilson call upd that delicacy and exotic insurance policy must be taken with regard to world trust and the ordinary being rational would pick out peace to war.3 The crucial pose before here is that open thinking matters in a democratic semi governmental dodging. The boldness hike up make is that the governmental kick iners are sensitive to customary spirit and depart be susceptible to their de opusds.\r\nThe issue of cosmos opinion gives rise to an other(a) go down of issues, and one of the foremost in this period, is the skepticism that the fundamental assumption of a rational man rejecting war is true. Is the public rational? Is war a rational pickax? The political explanation of rationality is the expertness of the public to discern the plectrons open to them, and to acquire the best option to attain their prioritized goals.\r\nThe great(p) War heave doubts as to whether public is necessarily aware of what their options and goals are, much(prenominal)(prenominal) less their efficacy to cull the best option to fit their preferred purpose. As historian A. J. P. Taylor argues that the quick-witted backlash against the de military creationizing war do the interwar years an â€Å" succession of intellectual and artistic activity”, where intellectuals from variou s field of study question the proponent of man to debate.4 The devastation of war do works queries, particularly from the escapists, as to whether war put up be a rational choice. Even if the assumption holds true, there is still the question as to whether public opinion has all weight on policy formulation.\r\n wedded this particular scene, this reputation questions the foundations of Wilsonian politics. This authorship forget so postulate on the influence of public opinion and the impact of rationality on the livelihood of peace by drawing off from the ideas of third important writers of this period: Edward Hallett Carr, Norman Angell and Alfred Zimmern. This paper get out low introduce the localizes of all three writers. It will thus examine the fundamental assumption divided by all three writers with respect to public opinion, before expounding on their pipelines on the rationality of the public and why the issue matters. The paper will then(prenominal) loo k into the possibilities of peace, and how the three concur on the issue of education. Due to source constraints, this paper will draw on aidary references to the works of the three writers, where the primary sources are non available.\r\nCarr, Angell and Zimmern\r\n slit Wilson in Thinkers of the cardinal years’ Crisis introduces Carr’s deem as â€Å"a work which non only set the tone for subsequent discussion of inter-war survey, plainly withal substantially configurationd postwar attitudes towards it.”5 The forego for The cardinal days’ Crisis is the critique of inter-war noble-mindedness, which Carr endpoints ‘utopian’6. Carr dismisses the ‘utopians’ as being ineffective to take political honesty and sets up a duality that supposes â€Å"utopia: reality= free will: determinism= speculation: pull= holiness: tycoon = comprehensive: relative= intellectual: administrative official= Left: Right” 7 Th e dichotomy presented by Carr undermines interwar idealism, and leads, in part, to the rejection of the operable value of these theories. This dichotomy shapes subsequent debate and is consequentially identified as the sign of the zodiac of realism and idealism, which will dominate international studies for the nigh few decades.\r\nIn order to posit queries of the dichotomy, it is first necessary to expound on the assumptions that are conventionally made of either school. Brian C. Schmidt summarises the assumptions of idealism as follows :\r\na pervasive cartel in curtilage and rationalism, a belief in the infallibility of public opinion, the view that war was chimerical, that the best trend to end battle was through education, international law, and world government, and, finally, a belief that the immanent harmony of interests existed, which translated into the international doctrine of â€Å"war-does-not-pay8.\r\nSuperficially, twain Norman Angell and Alfred Zimmern ad opt such assumptions in their writings. Signifi fuckingtly, both Angell and Zimmern section the same devotion to one come across teaching: the possibility of progress through educating public opinion and cracking human behaviour. Their devotion to the tenet became stronger afterward into their careers, especially after the Second gentleman War. The realist school of thought as represented by Carr, refutes the idealist assumptions. In particular, the realists argue that the concept of ‘power’ is inter variety to international affairs.\r\nCarr adopts Thomas Hobbes’ line of reasoning on human nature and advances the argument that the state as a rational actor will choose to maximise its qualification for power in order to prepare its survival. He argues that public opinion, even when sure, is not necessarily pacifist and that thought puke be excogitate by political purposes. Through defining his position by rejecting and critiquing the idealists assum ptions, Carr’s realist position is thus seen as the diametric opposite of the idealists.\r\nIt is then necessary to recompense both the ideas of Carr and the much-maligned interwar idealists, among whom are Zimmern and Angell. The choice of juxtaposing Angell and Zimmern with Carr in this paper is conscious. Both Zimmern and Angell are among the few ‘utopians’ whom Carr explicitly criticizes in The Twenty days’ Crisis. Andreas Osiander points out that Zimmern is â€Å"still wide regarded as what Oslon and Groom have tendered the ‘consummate’ idealist”9, and is thus identifiable with the idealist school of thought. still Zimmern, as Paul Rich and Peter Wilson suggest, is considerably less adverse to Carr’s ideas than his idealist colleagues.10 Angell, on the other hand, is one of the fiercest adversaries to The Twenty geezerhood’ Crisis, further J. D. dweeber raises the argument that â€Å"Angell should… be re garded less as an idealist than a far sighted realist” be set out of his â€Å" astute awareness” of the issues of political reality11. The interplay of their ideas then calls to question the stiffness of a clear dichotomy.\r\nIn essence then, this paper seek to question if the positions of these writers on the assumptions raised by Schmidt are as concrete as they get on to be. In other words, this paper examines the complexities of Carr, Angell and Zimmern’s ideas on the applicability of public opinion, rationality and possibilities of peace. On walking(prenominal) examination, this paper argues that despite the variations, the three share a fundamental similarity: the belief in progress. The dichotomy between the realists and idealists is permeable, and in their postulation of the long term, the arguments of Carr, Angell and Zimmern coincide.\r\n domain opinion\r\nFirst and foremost, the underlying assumption that Carr, Angell and Zimmern adopt is that pub lic opinion matters, even though their taste of public opinion differs. Zimmern argues that â€Å"[p]ublic opinion is the lifeblood of a cultured community” notwithstanding unfortunately, the fix of the peoples is fleetd by â€Å"caprice of ignorance, passion or greed, and the other devils if unreason.”12 The title of Carr’s inaugural speech at the University College of Wales, â€Å" prevalent touch as a fortress of ataraxis” says much. Carr argues that public opinion hindquarters exert tremendous influence over a foreign policy issue that it feels sufficiently strongly about, apply the case of the public rejection of the Hoare-Laval plan to get to his case.\r\nHe states that, â€Å"No nation, and least of all a democracy, jackpot wage war unless it has the support of an overwhelming majority of its people”13. The implication of such a assertion in light of guarding the peace is that insofar as the public is not in favour of war, a sta te and particularly a democratic state will not and understructurenot adopt war as a policy instrument. Angell’s Nobel Lecture, â€Å" quietness and the man Mind”, adopts the same position, except that he argues public opinion, being misinformed and â€Å" grimly erroneous” smoke lead to war. 14\r\nInterestingly both Angell and Carr argue that public opinion is comfortably manipulated. Carr devotes a section to â€Å" mightiness over opinion” in The Twenty old age’ Crisis, suggesting that the heavy(p)er proportion of public becoming conscious or involved in politics relates to the greatness that the ruling elite place on propaganda as an instrument of power. The influence of propaganda rests on the premise he sets earlier in the book that the crucial section of realism is the idea that thought is relative to purpose. 15 For instance, nationalism, as a form of ideology, could be seen as a representation by which the public can be persuaded to go to war. Similarly, Angell contends that a small war-ridden nonage is capable of appealing to the majority towards a policy that may not be in the majority’s best interests.16\r\n cause\r\nHaving open that public opinion has a role to play, we then move on to the crucial questions: is the public rational, and is war a rational choice? On both issues, there are significant differences between Carr and the idealists, arising from the difference in the way they interpret and infer from erstwhile(prenominal) and current events. Reason and rationality give rise to different outcomes for Carr and the idealists. An important observation is that Carr places much opinion in reason and rationality than do the others, opposition to our earlier presupposition that it is the idealists who have a â€Å"pervasive trustingness in reason and rationalism.”\r\nA proper description of what is meant by rational behaviour has yet to be renderd as a premise for argument. To pr oceed, we adopt jam Mill’s argument for the rational public opinion quoted in Carr as a guide to what rational behaviour entails:\r\nEvery man possessed of reason is accustomed to weigh show up and to be guided and determined by its preponderance. When various conclusions are, with their evidence presented with equal care and with equal science, there is a moral certainty, though some few mayhap misguided, that sterling(prenominal) number will jurist right, and the superlative force of evidence, whatever it is, will produce the superior impression. 17\r\nWhereas Carr conceptualises that the public, being expediencyed, is capable of defining their goals and seeking the best possible means to achieve toward that end, he rejects Mills’ definition of rational behaviour. Mills’ definition is in turn based on the ideas espoused by Jeremy Betham who assumes that the ideal option is the â€Å" sterling(prenominal) true(p) to the greatest number”. Carr argu es that public opinion comes from the cumulationes, who are for deep part, neither enlightened nor educated and thus â€Å"the greatest number” need not necessarily â€Å"judge right”.\r\nHe argues that Betham and Mills’ assumption that self-interest can be sacrificed for the sake of â€Å"the greatest good” to the collective is based on â€Å"some phase of intuition of what is right and cannot be demonstrated by rational argument.”18 Carr suggests, instead, that rational necessarily demands a consciousness and the ability to ad muchover to the balance of power existing in international affairs, which serves as a constraint on the options available. The discerning public thus does not only take into account what is right, unless alike what is most practical in ply to self-interest.\r\nCarr then adopts an argument that is parallel to Thomas Hobbes’. Hobbes, in Leviathan, states the fundamental law of nature as:\r\nit is a precept, or g eneral rule of reason that every(prenominal) man, ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use all helps, and advantages of war\r\nCarr comments, to the same effect, that although war is undesirable, it is not possible to impose an absolute persuasion that war is â€Å"al ways and unconditionally wrong.” The implication of Hobbes and Carr’s argument is that the public being rational favours peace. tho, when the public believes that they have more to gain from war, or more to lose from not going to war, war becomes a rational and logical solution.\r\nHistorically, Carr’s argument seems to adventure sufficient basis in the outbreak of World War I. One of the reasons contri entirelying to the war was the increase in bellicosity, arising from rationalization of cost and benefit or cooperation and non-cooperation. Prior to the Great War, the perceived cost of non-cooperation19 had decreas ed. The light was influenced by beliefs that any war would be short, a consequence of â€Å"a highly exaggerated faith in the efficacy of offensive military strategies and tactical maneuver”20 and by the system of alliances. The perception was further coloured by nationalism. Secondly the perceived gains of non-cooperation had increased. The general belief was that expansionism and offensive foreign policy was perceived to be also high, cod to the general doubt of the intentions of the other states. Given these perceptions then prevalent, European states adage it to their advantage to go to war, and in fact to novice the war so as to reap the greatest advantage of the ground. This international game possible action exemplifies in part the rational emergence that Carr espoused.\r\nThe idealists depart greatly from Carr. Angell and Zimmern accept that Mills’ definition is greatly want barely finds it incongruent with political reality. Reus-Smit, in his analys e â€Å"The Strange demolition of Liberal Theory”, argues that the conflict between piety and political reality is seen by Angell as a divide between â€Å"reason and unreason”. He argues that, â€Å"If the former prevailed, there was some hope of a reconciliation between morality, outlined as the well-being of all and reality, which in [Angell’s] favoured celestial sphere was the incompatibility of warfare and such well-being.21” However, deep down the historic context, Angell believes that ‘unreason’ prevailed. Angell believes that the public mind is often nonrational, because it is as well as easily persuaded; it does not possess sufficient information, nor the ability to process vast amounts of information when it is available and it lacks the scientific discipline to seek evidence for the various conclusions, as Mill points out, i.e., it cannot â€Å"see the belike results of litigates.”\r\n22 The public mind cannot compu te cost-benefit-analysis, which is central to rationalization. Angell accounts for this irrationality of the public mind, stating that it arises from the â€Å" ill luck to apply to our international relationships knowledge which is of practically universal possession”23 In Angell’s opinion then, it is not for the lack of intellectual capacity on the part of the public that lead to the irrational behaviour, but the inability to apply knowledge.\r\nResting on his idea of the irrational public, Angell expounds on the war and why the public’s choice to go to war is actually irrational. In his aptly named book, The Great Illusion, he puts forth a convincing argument on the futility of war on grounds of rationality and economic considerations. Angell argues that the perceived benefits of war under modern circumstances, are reduced, as victors can no lengthy expect to benefit as much from the spoils of war. The turn is largely because goods and spoils are no longer portable (such as gold, silver, slaves, precious stones) as they had before. Goods and services are non-physical such as currency, shares, and opinionated assets, and are thus not transferable wealth. As such, if states act purely in their self-interest, given the expected value not to gain from war, states would be unlikely to chase war.24\r\nAngell considers this line of reasoning to be simplistic and easily applicable to the gestate of international relations. Yet as the advent of World War I proves, the public is incapable of applying such rationale to political practice. Angell argues that the pervading reasons stub war, then, are irrational. Not only does war not serve to the benefit of the state concerned, break in alternatives of effect could be sought such as building economic relations, social interaction. Such connections can be used in persuading, as opposed to coercing, other states into behaving in the manner that is beneficial to the state concerned. hence t he argument adopted is that war is irrational, i.e. not the best-laid option, and man being irrational and susceptible to external influences, chooses to use war as a policy instrument.\r\nAndreas Osiander points out that â€Å"unlike what Carr implies, Zimmern, like Angell, was very far from see public opinion as necessarily a force for peace.25” Like Angell, he believes that the conflicts in the international arena, giving rise to war are effect of intellectual, and not political failure.26 However, if Carr is to be believed, Zimmern can, in fact, be seen as being more extreme than Angell. Carr states in The Twenty Years Crisis that Zimmern is inclined towards the hypothesis that â€Å"If populace in its international relations has signally failed to achieve the rational good, it must … have been as well erroneous to understand that good.” Carr’s statement is not altogether justified. Although Zimmern does point out that the impediment to overcoming the obstacle towards peace is that man â€Å"are beings of conservative temper and modified intelligence27”, what he implies is that man is reluctant to adjust to present realities brought by modernity. As a result of the indispensable pushance towards mixture, man’s mental capacity does not adapt to the fact that previous ways of managing international relations are no longer applicable.\r\nConsequentially, public opinion cannot be trusted to be rational. Zimmern subscribes to John Stuart Mill’s argument of the â€Å" totalism of the majority”. He argues that the ruling elite, that is, the politicians in positions of power tend to be capable of rationalization. However this intellectual minority in government is consumed by the irrational public: â€Å"for statesmen, however wise and far sighted, are limited in their policies by the public opinion and parliaments to which they are responsible.28” Angell concurs on this issue. J. D. Miller, dra wing from Angell’s comments, argues that Angell too â€Å"feared the impact upon politicians of an unreasoning crowd mind, and doubted the capacity of politicians to resist it”.\r\nBoth Angell and Zimmern, then, prefer that the intellectual minority be given the ability and power to lead the rest of the populace, so as to govern rational foreign policies. In this regard, Carr again differs. Whereas Carr does agree that the intellectual minority has a role to play in preeminent public opinion,29 he believes that the intellectual minority is however, sadly, out of touch with reality. He argues his case by drawing on the difference between intellectuals’ perceptions of the League of Nations with those of the man on the street. The intellectuals, who tend to be idealists by his definition, get to to secure and maintain peace via means of treaties, covenants and profound codifications. The general public, however, is more concerned with the practice of internation al affairs (as opposed to the theory.) Going by Carr’s understanding of rational behaviour to be pickings into account what is right and also what is most practical in application, the intellectual minority is in practice less rational than the public.\r\nChange and the possibility of progress\r\nAs it is, there seems to be a great divide between Carr and his two contemporaries with regards to whether man is rational. However, central to their arguments is the shared belief that history is a directional process, that is, there is the idea of constant change. Carr argues that war occurs because of the conservative reluctance to allow change to the circumstance quo and the way to peace is to provide means of unruffled change.30 Angell and Zimmern suggest that war occurs because man has yet to come to terms with change, and that the mentality and psyche of the populace has not kept in line with international developments. As Zimmern states, â€Å"the statesmen and the peoples have not adjusted their minds to the new realities”31.\r\nThe central concern with the issue of change harkens to a broader issue on which the three writers concur: the possibility of progress. The interwar context is one of pessimism. The first decade had been one of recuperation and rehabilitation from the shock of the Great War and the second decade of mounting tensions and escalation to an even more disastrous war. The context in which these writers write in, then, begets the question of whether man can move away from destruction of war, and by what means.\r\nThe three writers agree that the current situation calls for change, as present movements and measures to maintain peace are shy(predicate) and inadequate, and are reasonably optimistic that such change can be effected. Carr notes even in 1936 that, â€Å"the cause of peace has made tremendous stride during the one-time(prenominal) fifteen years and shows his preference towards progressive history, public debat e that â€Å"a sense of change as a progressive factor in history, and belief in reason as our guide for the understanding of its complexities” are crucial to the current world. Angell is of the same mind when he questions the unchangeability of human nature and argues that just as cannibalism and slavery can be systematically reduced in our society, so too can the competitive nature of man and states32. Zimmern, even when decrying the decline of international standards (which he defined as rules of behaviour) at a meeting at Chatham House in 1937 argues that the process of change allowing for quiet coexistence was already taking place.33\r\nThe final aim of change is the maintenance of peace, which is assumed to be the preferred good, through the avoidance of war. The question that is then posited is, by what means? Carr, Angell and Zimmern propose different measures but the one pertinent to the prior argument on public opinion and rationality is their faith in education. Due to their fundamental belief that public opinion matters, it is logical to argue that if the public mind, as Angell would call it, could be trained and conditioned to favour ‘peaceful change’, then the chances of states going to war would be minimized. Angell quotes in his The Great Illusion that â€Å"Not the facts, but men’s opinions about the facts is what matters”, and making a parallel with the abolishment of witch hunts, he comments that â€Å"just as in the matter of burning witches a change of behaviour was the outcome of a change of opinion… in a same way a change in the political conduct of can only come about as a result of a change of thought”34. The way to peace then is to shape man’s perceptions about war.\r\nGiven this understanding, the most basic and possibly most efficient way of legal transfer about this conditioned public is through education. However in his address given to Chatham House in 1931, Angell claims that the current education system does not adequately prepare the individual to make intelligent and informed inferences from the facts presented to him. He believes that the reason merchant ship this lack in the system is that education tends to follow a customs duty whereby an older generation influences and instruct the younger through a process of socialization.35 Unfortunately this tradition means that values and ideas that are taught are often unable to catch up with present realities. The educational system had also focused on provision of information, without armament the individual with means to discern the motivations, the causation analysis, the implications et cetera behind the piece of information.\r\nAccording to him, â€Å"We have thought too much of the facts and too little of their meaning.” 36 thereof the socialization/education of an individual does not adequately provide him with the skill to make rational choices. Given his premise that war is irration al under any circumstances lest in defence and a rational public will therefore reject war, the skill deficiency means that man may choose to go to war due to their lack of understanding, unless the educational system can be changed.\r\nBeyond the jot that education shifts its focus from its informational purpose towards equipping serial generations with the skill to possess information, Angell does not however provide for how education can be otherwise structured. Zimmern elaborates on his ideal educational system in his book Learning and Leadership, which is not only designed to carry on the skill of discerning information but also specifically equipped to teach students about international life.\r\nParticularly, he believes that practical experience through interaction with people from other nations will allow students to string the habit of cooperation and harmonious living37. Zimmern believes that once people are given more exposure to the international arena, they will be able to understand foreigners and foreign influences better and become more acutely aware of the idea of universal brotherhood. This basic premise being established, man will be more able to understand the actions of others, less inclined to take preemptive action and to go to war. The assumption of such an argument is that people are less inclined to advocate war against a party that they share an understanding with. precept is thus seen as an instrument which can build commonality among peoples, as well as a means by which the public can be trained to be rational.\r\nIn The Twenty Years’ Crisis, Carr argues for the application of reason to understanding current situations and political reality; in his later work What is register he extends the role of reason to the capacity to rejuvenate:\r\nThe primary function of reason, as applied to man in society, is no longer merely to investigate, but to transform; and this heightened consciousness of the power of men to better the management of his social, economic and political affairs by the application of rational processes seems to me one of the major aspects of the twentieth century. 38\r\nThe core assumptions here are that reason leads to progress and progress is necessarily an improvement. Remembering the key concern of the study of international relations in the interwar period, a foremost improvement of the human condition is the eradication of war. As do Angell and Zimmern, Carr believes that education was to be the tool by which such improvement can come about. However, unlike Zimmern and Angell who believe that the public has to be thought how to make rational choices in the first place, Carr believes that education can be used to shape the way the public thinks about their choices. Carr notes then that education policy must be shaped:\r\nEducators at all levels are nowadays more and more consciously concerned to make their contribution to the pliant of society in a particular mould, and to ing rain in the rising generation the attitudes, loyalties and opinions appropriate to that character of society: educational policy is an integral part of any rationally planned social policy.39\r\nIt is then assumed, that rationally, a society will be prefer not to resort to war in a conflict of interest, and a means by which this can be ensured is to design an educational system which, in the context of the interwar years, should imbue in them the moral norm that ‘peaceful change’ is the preferred means of achieving policy objectives.\r\nTo put it more plainly, Carr’s ideal is utilize education to persuade man against the doctrine of power, providing a basis whereby a compromise between morality and power can be reached and peaceful change achieved. In his contention that thought is relative to purpose, Carr postulates that mass opinion can directed and in fact ‘mass-produced’ via ‘universal popular education’. It is overbearing to not e that by popular education, Carr has included the mass media.( Carr does not, however differentiate between education and propaganda in The Twenty Years’ Crisis though in What is History, he associates education with rationality and the â€Å"growing consciousness from on a lower floor as well as from above of the role which reason can play”40).\r\nThe application of reason and rationality therefore means that education can be used to persuade mankind against war. sooner of making an argument that war is irrational, educators can influence the public into making a conscious choice not to use war as a policy instrument. As Carr states, â€Å"I regard as of immense importance and promise the gradual fender of the area of the world’s surface inwardly which war has been in effect been placed under the ban,” such that war is actually unthinkable41.\r\nWhat becomes interesting is how closely Carr mirrors the ‘utopians’ he derides. Peter Wilson, in his attempt to understand what Carr means by ‘utopian’, lists the various characteristics that Carr associates with the term. According to his analysis, all of these characteristics are ” ‘progressive ideas’; and it might be therefore be concluded that the core characteristic of interwar idealism is belief in conscious, progressive change”. On this basis, Carr does not seem to be any much different, which recalls Reus-Smit’s observation quoted earlier in this paper that Carr is himself not a consummate realist. It is also possible to put forth an argument that Carr’s argument against utopianism was never meant to be an outright and unconditional rejection of the interwar theories.\r\n remnant\r\nWhether or not these three writers think the public mind is rational depends largely on whether they believe war can be a rational choice, and yet regardless of their perspectives on these two issues, they believe that progress towards avoidance of war can be ensured through changing human behaviour. Education policies thus become important, as they can shape the perceptions of the public and thus affect their choices, which is in turn reflected in the chosen foreign policy. However there is a point to note based on this argument set. All three writers are writing within a democratic framework and tradition, where by definition, requires that public opinion matters. Yet, public opinion is less likely to make an impact in an authoritarian state, and even in democratic states, there is the consideration of public apathy, the leaders gambling and taking risks by not going according to public opinion, et cetera.\r\nThese complications bring us back to the consideration of Wilsonian politics. Woodrow Wilson professes that his aim is to make the world safe for democracy, and that democracy will bring peace. His tendency has been to look at the building and maintenance of peace from a top down approach, where the politic al structure and political ideological apparatus are enforced. In other words, he looks to providing a chemical mechanism which will allow the rational public to oppose the tendencies of the militant minority from dragging the state to war. However, from the ideas of Carr, Angell and Zimmern, such a mechanism would not function effectively against war unless the public mind can be first conditioned through a adapted educational system emphasizing co-operation and peace.\r\n1 David Long, â€Å" refinement: Interwar idealism, liberal internationalism and contemporary international theory”. Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-war idealism reassessed. p. 303, pp. 306-307.\r\n2 Quoted in E. H. Carr’s inaugural speech in the University College of Wales. â€Å"Public Opinion as a bulwark of Peace” supranational personal matters (Royal Institute of supranational personal business 1931-1939). Vol. 15. No. 6. (Nov- Dec 1936), p. 846.\r\n3 Mortimer C hambers, et al. The Western deliver Vol C: The Modern Era. pp. 892-893\r\n4 A. J. P. Taylor, From Sarajevo to Potsdam. capital of the United Kingdom: Thames & angstrom; Hudson: 1966 pp. 103-106\r\n5 Peter Wilson. â€Å"Introduction: The Twenty Years’ Crisis and the Category of ‘Idealism’ in outside(a) dealing”. David Long & Peter Wilson. (ed.) Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-war idealism reassessed. Oxford: Oxford University stuff: 1995. p.1\r\n6 Carr’s term ‘utopians’ is generally taken to refer to the idealists, though he does not clearly define who he considers to be utopians.\r\n7 Wilson, â€Å"Introduction”, p. 12. Wilson adapted the equation from Hedley Bull, â€Å"The Twenty Crisis Thirty Years On”, International diary, release 24, Vol. 4 (1969), p. 627-8. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919-1939. modernistic York: harper: (1946) 1964. pp. 11-21.\r\n8 Brian C. Schmidt. â⠂¬Å"Lessons from the Past: reassessing the Interwar Disciplinary History of International Relations”. International Studies Quarterly (1998) 42. p 452\r\n9 Andreas Osiander, â€Å"Rereading advance(prenominal) Twentieth Century IR theory: Idealism Revisited”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Sep.,1998). p. 417\r\n10 Paul Rich, â€Å"Alfred Zimmern’s Catious Idealism: the League of Nations, International Education, and the Commonwealth”. Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-war idealism reassessed. p.88; Peter Wilson, â€Å"Carr and his Early Crtics: responses to the Twenty Years’ Crisis”. Michael Cox (ed). E. H. Carr: A critical appraisal. New York: Palgrave: 2000. p. 167.\r\n11 J. D. Miller. â€Å"Norman Angell and Rationality in International Relations”. Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-war idealism reassessed. pp. 116, 119.\r\n12 Alfred Zimmern, Learning and Leadership: a study of the needs and possibilities of international intellectual co-operation. London: Oxford University Press: 1928. p. 10; p. 82.\r\n13 Carr, â€Å"Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace” pp. 857-858.\r\n14 Norman Angell, Peace and the Public Mind. June 12, 1935. http://www.nobel.se/cgi-bin/print. March 24, 2004.\r\n15 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis. pp. 132-133; pp. 67-75\r\n16 Norman Angell Peace and the Public Mind. para. 19\r\n17 quoted in E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis. p 24.\r\n18 Ibid. p. 26; p. 41\r\n19 The line of reasoning here is tied to the idea of an international game theory, which due to practical constraints cannot be covered here. The argument is made in line with Robert Jervis theory on international behaviour in his â€Å"Cooperation Under surety quandary” World Politics. Vol. 30, No. 2 (Jan, 1978), pp.167-214.\r\n20 Stephen van Evera, â€Å"Why co-operation failed in 1914”. World Politics, Vol. 38. No. 1 (Oct, 1985). p. 81\r\n21 Ch ristian Reus-Smit, â€Å"The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory”. European Journal of International Law. Vol. 12. No. 3. pp. 578-9.\r\n22 J. D. Miller. Norman Angell and the Futility of War: Peace and the public mind. London: Macmillian: 1986. pp/ 124-125.\r\n23 Norman Angell. Peace and the Public mind. para. 17\r\n24 Norman Angell. Europe’s Optical Illusion. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent , 1909(?)24-40; The Great Illusion:A study of the relation of military power to national advantage. London: William Heinemann 1913. pp. 26-40.\r\n25 Andreas Osiander, â€Å"Rereading Early Twentieth Century IR theory” p. 417\r\n26 Alfred Zimmern, Learning and Leadership. p. 11.\r\n27 Alfred Zimmern, â€Å"The Problem with Collective Security” (ed) Q. Wright. Neutrality and Collective Security. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 1936. p. 8.\r\n28 Ibid.\r\n29 E. H. Carr, â€Å"Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace”. p. 854.\r\n30 E. H. Car r. The Twenty Years Crisis. pp. 208-223\r\n31 Alfred Zimmern Learning and Leadership. p. 22\r\n32 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion. 1913. pp. 200-221.\r\n33 Alfred Zimmern, â€Å"The eliminate of International Standards”International Affiars (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939). Vol 17. No. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1938), p. 21.\r\n34 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion. P. 327\r\n35 Norman Angell, â€Å"Popular Education and International Affairs” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International affairs 1931-1939) Vol. 11, No. 3 (May 1932), p. 323\r\n36 Ibid, p 335-338, 338\r\n37 Alfred Zimmern Learning and Leadership. p. 26-60\r\n38 E. H. Carr. What is History? New York , St. Martin’s Press , 1961 p 190\r\n39 Ibid.\r\n40 Ibid p. 195. Propaganda is associated with the emotive and not with reason.\r\n41 E. H. Carr. â€Å"Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace”. p. 861.\r\n'